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Abstract 
This paper studies the incentives of an unregulated monopolist to undertake the socially 
optimal investment in NGA networks when it takes into account the fact that the NGA 
deployment is a two-dimensional investment decision concerning both the quality (or 
equivalently, technology) and the geographic coverage. It is found that both the privately 
and the socially optimal investment decisions result in a geographically differentiated 
NGA deployment implying that different quality NGA networks are deployed in different 
geographic areas. In particular, NGA networks of higher (lower) quality are deployed in 
the more (less) densely populated geographic areas. Although such geographically 
differentiated NGA investment leads the monopolist to provide a nationwide NGA 
deployment, it is found that the monopolist underinvests compared to the socially optimal 
levels of both technology and geographic coverage. In addition, since the objectives of 
the Europe 2020 Strategy concern both the NGA technology and the NGA coverage, this 
paper shows that the first objective of providing all Europeans with access to much 
higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps is feasible when the demand for NGA-based 
services is significantly elastic, whereas the second objective of providing internet 
connection speeds of 100 Mbps to 50% or more of European households is not a feasible 
goal. 
Keywords: Broadband, geographic areas, investment incentives, next generation access 
networks, telecommunications 
1. Introduction 
Investments in Next Generation Access (NGA) networks
1
, which allow ultra fast internet 
connections, are expected to have a positive impact on economic growth, employment 
and social prosperity. This fact has been notably highlighted in the European 
Commission Recommendation on regulated access to NGA (EC, 2010a) and in the 
Digital Agenda for Europe (EC, 2010b), whereas it has been empirically proven by 
Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer and Woessmann (2011) and Katz, Vaterlaus, Zenhäusern 
and Suter (2010). However, recent data from the European Commission (EC, 2012) 
shows that European telecommunication operators are reluctant to invest in NGA 
networks. According to the Dutch regulatory authority, OPTA (2008), the main factors 
that negatively affect an investor’s incentives to invest in NGA networks are: (i) the 
uncertainty about future demand for new NGA-based services; and (ii) the regulatory 
uncertainty related to the regulator’s limited ability to make ex ante credible 
commitments. Therefore, there is a growing interest among policy makers about the 
optimal regulatory policy that promotes both competition and investment in NGA 
networks.  
 
1.1. Regulatory concerns 
In fact, the assessment of such optimal regulatory policy is a very complex and 
challenging task because there are many different factors that affect the profitability of an 
NGA investment project and the subsequent competition outcomes. This implies that 
regulators have to make a number of decisions that directly affect the level of NGA 
deployment and the intensity of competition. 
Initially, regulators have to decide the regulatory regime applied to the NGA market. 
Permanent regulation implies that the ex ante imposed remedies hold for the whole 
lifecycle of the NGA investment, whereas regulatory forbearance refers to the situation 
where there is no ex ante regulation on NGA networks. Regulatory holidays and sunset 
clauses are intermediate regulatory regimes between regulatory forbearance and 
permanent regulation. Under regulatory holidays, the investor is not imposed to any 
regulatory constraints for a predetermined period of time, whereas by imposing a sunset 
clause, the regulator commits that will withdraw access obligations after a predetermined 
date. It is obvious that regulatory forbearance or holidays appear superior to the other 
regulatory regimes in terms of both NGA investment level and the timing of the 
investments but they fail to promote an efficient competition level (Charalampopoulos, 
Katsianis and Varoutas, 2011; Gavosto, Ponte and Scaglioni, 2007; Nitsche and 
Wiethaus, 2011). 
Secondly, regulators have to assess the level of the access price that an access seeker 
should pay to the NGA investor in order to have access to the fibre-based access 
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 According to European Commission (EC, 2010a), Next Generation Access (NGA) networks means wired 
access networks which consist wholly or in part of optical elements and which are capable of delivering 
broadband access services with enhanced characteristics (such as higher throughput) as compared to those 
provided over already existing copper networks. In most cases NGAs are the result of an upgrade of an 
already existing copper or coaxial access network. 
networks. This regulatory decision has attracted much interest in the policy debate. A 
sizeable number of papers study the effect of different combinations of regulatory 
regimes and access prices on an operator’s investment incentives and on the subsequent 
social welfare outcomes. A first literature strand concludes that an unbundling policy that 
boosts entry by alternative operators promotes static efficiency but leads to losses in 
dynamic efficiency (Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven, 2010).
2
 This implies that cost-
oriented access prices is an effective regulatory tool for fostering service-based 
competition in order to improve static efficiency, but they cannot promote investments in 
new NGA networks by either incumbents or entrants since the investors are not 
compensated for the uncertainty of NGA investment.
3
  
As a result, a second literature strand studies the impact of alternative regulatory settings 
on promoting both static and dynamic efficiency. In particular, this set of papers explores 
the effectiveness of several investment-contingent access prices to increase both static 
and dynamic efficiency when a single operator invests under either demand uncertainty 
(Bender, 2011; Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011) or regulatory uncertainty (Klumpp and Su, 
2010; Sarmento and Brandao, 2007; Tselekounis and Varoutas, 2013), as well as, when 
two operators invest in non-overlapping areas (Henriques, 2011; Sauer, 2011). This 
literature concludes that compensating the investor(s) for the uncertainty of NGA 
investment through an investment-contingent access price can achieve both static and 
dynamic efficiency under certain demand, cost and regulatory conditions. 
The aforementioned papers that study the impact of alternative regulatory regimes and 
access pricing rules on investment and competition outcomes neglect the fact that there is 
a period during which both copper and NGA networks are in operation and are competing 
for customers. Therefore, the third regulatory decision concerns the level of the access 
price applied to the copper access network. This regulatory task gives rise to a more 
recent stream of papers which discuss the impact of the regulation of the copper access 
network on the firms’ investment incentives when the NGA market is left unregulated or 
when there is an interplay between the access prices of the two networks (Bourreau, 
Cambini and Doğan, 2013; Bourreau, Cambini and Doğan, 2012; Bourreau, Lupi and 
Manenti, 2013; Brito, Pereira and Vareda, 2012; Cambini and Silvestri, 2012; Cave, 
Fournier and Shutova, 2012; Inderst and Peitz, 2012; Neumann and Vogelsang, 2013). 
The main conclusion of this literature is that although a higher access charge for the 
copper access network seems to lead to lower incentives to invest for the firm owning the 
copper access network and to stronger incentives to invest for its competitor, a positive 
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 Static efficiency concerns the short-run regulatory goal to provide firms with significant incentives to 
invest in innovative, differentiated services. Such service-based competition leads to a self-sustaining pro-
competitive market structure in which firms behave in a competitive manner, and hence, the consumers 
enjoy the welfare gains from static efficiency (lower prices, better quality and extended variety of services). 
On the other hand, dynamic efficiency concerns the long-run goal of access regulation to induce the firms 
to undertake the socially optimal (efficient) investment decisions in new competing infrastructures. Such 
facilities-based competition achieves the full benefits of competition, and hence, the consumers enjoy the 
full welfare gains from dynamic efficiency (maximum market growth in terms of both volume and value so 
that markets achieve minimized costs, innovative technologies and advanced services). 
3
 See Cambini and Jiang (2009) for an excellent review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between broadband investment and regulation. 
correlation between the access prices of the two networks incentivizes the migration to 
the NGA network. 
A last regulatory decision, which has mostly been overlooked in the related literature, 
concerns the possibility of defining different geographical markets according to the 
prevailing competitive and cost conditions, and therefore, the imposition of 
geographically differentiated remedies. Indeed, after a period of obligation of non-
discrimination (EC, 2002), currently, price discrimination is allowed to a certain (at least 
wholesale) extent related to NGA networks in Europe in order to foster innovation and 
welfare growth by promoting investments (EC, 2010a). Bourreau, Cambini and Hoerning 
(2013) assume that differentiated wholesale access schemes vary according to the degree 
of infrastructure competition and point out that the regulator faces a dilemma between 
setting a lower access charge to maximize per-area welfare by maintaining lower retail 
prices, and setting a high access charge to maximize investment incentives. They show 
that differentiated remedies (where access is regulated in non-competitive areas, while 
access is privately negotiated in competitive areas) can be either too high or too low from 
a social perspective. 
From the above analysis, it can be deduced that the derivation of an optimal regulatory 
policy that promotes both NGA investment and competition is a very difficult and 
complex task since it requires the estimation of the impact of four interrelated decisions 
on the twofold regulatory goal. This task becomes even more complex if we take into 
account the previously overlooked fact that the deployment of an NGA network is a two-
dimensional investment decision.  
 
1.2. The two dimensions of an NGA investment decision 
A potential investor in an NGA network has to decide: (i) the quality of the NGA 
network which is closely related to the provided NGA technology, and hence, to the 
provided internet connection speeds; and (ii) the geographic coverage of the NGA 
deployment.  
The first decision is related to the part of the copper wire being replaced by fibre optics. 
There are certain NGA architectures, the most common of which are: (i) Fibre-to-the-
Curb (FTTC); (ii) Fibre-to-the-Building (FTTB); and (iii) Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH). It 
is obvious that the higher the part of the copper wire being replaced by fibre optics, the 
higher the internet connection speeds that can be provided to end-users. However, the 
quality of the NGA network is not only affected by the particular point of the local loop 
at which the fibre is terminated, but also by the particular access technology used to 
implement each architecture. In particular, the FFTH architecture can be implement by 
using either the point-to-point (P2P) connectivity technology, in which each device at the 
subscriber premises is connected through a dedicated optical fibre to a switch port located 
at the central office of the investor, or the point-to-multi-point (P2M)/ passive optical 
network (PON) connectivity technology which divides an optical signal into several 
shared connections. As a result, an investor in NGA network has to decide the 
combination of the NGA architecture and the connectivity technology that leads to a 
deployment of an NGA network of a particular quality (or NGA technology). This 
decision is closely related to the internet connection speeds that will be provided by the 
investor to its consumers. The second decision concerns the geographical extent of the 
NGA deployment. Therefore, the investor also chooses the geographic areas in which a 
fibre-based access network will be deployed. This decision determines the geographic 
NGA coverage.  
Although the research papers that study the impact of the four interrelated regulatory 
decisions on investment incentives and competition outcomes separately treat the two 
dimensions of an NGA investment decision, it should be noted that the investor’s 
decisions concerning the NGA technology and the geographic NGA coverage are closely 
related. In particular, existing studies assume that a prospective investor in NGA 
networks chooses either the quality or the geographic coverage of the NGA network. This 
implies that the investor decides: (i) the quality of the NGA network that will be provided 
in an exogenously given number of geographic areas; or (ii) the number of geographic 
areas in which an exogenously given NGA technology network will be deployed. In each 
case, the investor focuses on one of the two dimensions of the NGA investment decision 
by taking the other dimension as given. A reasonable extension would be to consider a 
static modeling approach in which an investor endogenously chooses its optimal NGA 
technology network that will be deployed only in the geographic areas that the 
investment is proven to be profitable.  
This paper goes one step beyond and models the fact that the investor chooses the NGA 
technology that will be provided in each geographic area.
4
 Therefore, not only the quality 
of the NGA network and the coverage of the NGA deployment are both endogenously 
chosen by the investor, but also different NGA technologies may co-exist according to 
the prevailing demand and cost conditions in each geographic area. This modeling setup 
is the first step towards studying an operator’s incentives to deploy a geographically 
differentiated NGA network. As a result, this paper derives the provided NGA 
technology in each geographic area, as well as, the optimal number of areas that will be 
upgraded to any NGA technology. In addition, it compares the privately optimal two-
dimensional investment decision with the socially optimal geographically differentiated 
NGA deployment. In other words, the aim of this paper is to assess whether the 
regulatory decision to allow an investor to deploy a quality-differentiated NGA network 
can promote both static and dynamic efficiency (i.e. induces the socially optimal 
investment outcome).  
It should be noted that the derived results are comparable to the objectives of the Europe 
2020 Strategy (EC, 2010b) which envisions that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans will have 
access to much higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50% or more of 
European households will subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps. It is 
obvious that these goals concern both the NGA technology and the NGA coverage, and 
hence, the research focus should shift towards modeling approaches that take into 
account the fact that the NGA deployment is a two-dimensional investment decision 
which results in a geographically differentiated NGA deployment.   
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 In fact, the investor has also to decide the time at which it will build an NGA network of a particular 
quality in each geographic area. However, the optimal timing of an NGA investment is studied using 
dynamic modeling approaches, and hence, is out of the scope of this paper, although we acknowledge that 
it provides an excellent field for future research.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an outline of the 
basic assumptions and definitions of the model. Section 3 compares the privately and the 
socially optimal investment levels in terms of both quality and geographic coverage in 
order to assess whether the investor undertakes the socially optimal investment decision. 
The last section summarizes the main results of this article and proposes the directions for 
future work. 
 
2. The model 
This section presents an innovative modeling setup which aims at reflecting the fact that 
the NGA deployment is a two-dimensional investment decision which concerns both the 
NGA technology and the geographic NGA coverage. Since the goal of the paper is to 
assess whether the regulatory decision to allow an investor to deploy a different quality 
NGA network in each geographic area can promote both investment and social welfare, 
all the other regulatory decisions are exogenously chosen in order to simplify the model 
as much as possible. In particular, it is assumed that the investor is not obliged to provide 
access to its improved access infrastructures to its competitors, which implies that the 
monopolist firm invests in NGA networks under regulatory forbearance. Although such 
monopolistic regime does not resolve the trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency, the study of the derived investment outcomes is very useful for comparison 
purposes since they obviously represent the upper limit of the investment level.  It is 
further assumed that the deployment of an NGA network eliminates the services provided 
over the pure copper access network (e.g. ADSL), and hence, the impact of the access 
price applied to the copper access network is of no significance. The last assumption 
made concerns the imposition of geographically differentiated remedies. In particular, the 
monopolist investor is allowed to geographically price discriminate in the retail market, 
which of course, increases its investment incentives compared to the uniform pricing 
regime (Alexandrov and Deb, 2012; Tselekounis, Maniadakis and Varoutas, 2013; 
Valletti, 2006).  
The model used in this paper is based on a hypothetical country consisting of a 
continuum of geographic areas which can be indexed in a decreasing order according to 
their population density. In particular, geographic areas are indexed by i  with [1, ]i n , 
where low values of i  imply geographic areas with high population density, whereas 
geographic areas that are indexed by i  close to n  represent rural areas (i.e. with low 
population density). A monopolist provides a basic “universal-level” broadband service 
(e.g. ADSL) to all geographic areas at a uniform price. Now assume that the monopolist 
invests in access network upgrade by deciding which geographic areas will be passed by 
any technology NGA network and which NGA quality will be provided in each 
geographic area. Therefore, the monopolist initially determines the geographic extent of 
the NGA deployment denoted by max [1, ]x n  and then decides which NGA technology 
denoted by min max[ , ]i i iy y y will be provided in each geographic area ix , [1, ]i n . 
Obviously both investment decisions are continuous in [1, ]n  and min max[ , ]i iy y , 
respectively. It is expected that the most densely populated geographic area ( 1x ) will be 
covered by the highest quality NGA network ( max
iy ), whereas the least densely populated, 
but NGA-passed, area ( maxx ) will be covered by the lowest quality NGA network (
min
iy ). 
Contrary to the existing studies which assume that a higher level of NGA investment in 
terms of either technology or coverage leads to a more outward parallel shift in the 
demand curve (and thus equally benefits all consumers), this paper models the fact that a 
higher NGA technology network positively affects the consumers’ willingness to pay for 
ultra-fast NGA-based services, but its impact declines as it is provided to more rural 
areas. The reason is that consumers who place a higher (lower) valuation to broadband 
subscription tend to live in higher (lower) densely populated areas (EC, 2010b; Götz, 
2013; Preston, Cawley and Metykova, 2007). In addition, the investment cost is assumed 
to be increasing and convex reflecting the fact that the NGA investment becomes 
marginally more expensive as a better quality NGA network is deployed in order to 
provide end-users with higher internet connection speeds. However, contrary to existing 
studies which assume an exogenously given slope of the marginal investment cost 
function, this paper models the fact that the investment cost of providing a particular 
NGA technology becomes marginally more expensive as it is extended to less densely 
populated areas. Once again, population density has been proven to be an effective proxy 
for reflecting the fact that the investment cost per potential user decreases in the 
population density (Götz, 2013). It is thus obvious that geographic areas not only differ 
with respect to the cost of rolling out an NGA network of a particular technology, but 
also with respect to the impact of such NGA deployment on consumers’ willingness to 
pay. Therefore, the demand and the investment cost functions in each geographic area i  
are given, respectively, by: 
2
i
i i
i
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p A q
x
     (1) 
and   
2
( )
2
i ix yC i   (2) 
where ip  and iq  denote the retail market price and the quantity supplied, respectively, in 
each geographic area, 0  represents the slope of the inverse demand function and A  
represents the maximum valuation that the consumers place to the services provided over 
the pure copper access network when the NGA investment has not taken place. In 
addition, ix  reflects the geographic NGA deployment and iy  reflects the NGA 
technology. A larger ix  implies an NGA deployment to less densely populated areas, 
whereas a larger iy  implies a fibre deployment closer to the consumers’ premises 
combined with a better connectivity technology. It is obvious that a higher NGA 
technology positively affects the consumers’ willingness to pay, but its impact declines as 
it is provided to more rural areas. In addition, the investment cost of providing a higher 
NGA technology becomes marginally more expensive as it is extended to less densely 
populated areas.  
 
3. Investment and welfare outcomes 
This section studies the incentives of an unregulated monopolist to undertake the socially 
optimal investment decision in terms of both NGA technology provided in each 
geographic area and geographic coverage of the NGA deployment. As usual, the game is 
solved backwards. This implies that in the third stage, the investment cost is sunk and the 
monopolist sets the geographic differentiated retail prices of the different ultra-fast 
broadband services provided in each area given the level of NGA deployment chosen in 
the first stage and the quality of the NGA network chosen in the second stage. 
 
3.1. Privately optimal level of NGA technology 
The profit function of the investor (net of investment cost) derived from the investment 
iy  in each geographic region ix  is given by: 
i i ip q   (3) 
Substituting the solution of Eq. (1) with respect to iq  in Eq. (3) and taking the first order 
condition with respect to ip  gives the retail market price that maximizes the monopolist’s 
profits in each geographic area.  
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As a result, the optimum quantity supplied in each geographic area is given by: 
 
2
*
22
i i
i
i
Ax y
q
x


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 (5) 
Obviously, both the retail price and the quantity supplied in each geographic area are 
positively affected by a higher NGA technology and a higher population density. 
Substituting Eqs. (4) and (5) into Eq. (3) and taking into account the investment cost in 
each geographic area given by Eq. (2) yields the profits of the investor in each geographic 
area as a function of the NGA technology ( iy ) and the index of the corresponding 
geographic area ( ix ).   
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Ax y x y
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 
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 (6) 
Taking the first order condition of Eq. (6) with respect to iy  gives the quality of the NGA 
network that maximizes the monopolist’s regional profits.  
2
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M
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i
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 (7) 
Equation (7) shows the level of NGA technology iy  that the monopolist investor is 
willing to install in each geographic area ix . Obviously, the privately optimal level of the 
NGA technology is different among the various geographic areas. In particular, by 
studying the first and second derivatives of Eq. (7) with respect to ix , it is concluded that 
the privately optimal level of NGA technology in each geographic area is a decreasing 
and convex function of ix . This implies that the unregulated monopolist chooses a 
geographically differentiated NGA network in terms of the provided quality. In other 
words, the less (more) densely populated a geographic area is, the less (more) the extent 
of NGA upgrade that maximizes the investor’s regional profits.  
 
3.2. Socially optimal level of NGA technology 
Social welfare is the unweighted sum of profits and consumer surplus. Given that the 
consumer surplus in each geographic area is given by 2( ) / 2i iCS q , it is deduced that 
the socially optimal level of NGA technology should maximize the following social 
welfare function: 
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
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 (8) 
Therefore, the socially optimal level of NGA technology is given by taking the first order 
condition of Eq. (8) with respect to iy : 
  2
2 5
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 (9) 
By studying the first and second derivatives of Eq. (9) with respect to ix , it is deduced 
that the socially optimal level of NGA technology in each geographic area is also a 
decreasing and convex function of ix . This implies that the society is better off by a 
geographically differentiated NGA network in terms of the provided quality. 
 
3.3. Comparison of privately and socially optimal levels of NGA technology 
The comparison of Eqs. (7) and (9) shows that the level of NGA investment in quality in 
each geographic area imposed by the investor’s private investment incentives is less than 
the corresponding socially optimal level of NGA investment in quality (i.e. 
M SW
i i
y y ). 
Proof. 
2 2
2 5 5
(2 1)
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72 0iA x   which holds since , , 0iA x   ■ 
 
Therefore, the following proposition can be stated: 
Proposition 1. The unregulated investor always underinvests compared to the socially 
optimal investment level of NGA quality (or technology).   
The above result is graphically presented by Figure 1. The solid line reflects the privately 
optimal NGA quality provided in each geographic area, whereas the dashed line reflects 
the corresponding socially optimal level. 
 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between ix  and iy  from a private and a social perspective 
 (for 10A   and 0.9  ) 
 
3.4. Privately and socially optimal levels of geographic NGA coverage 
The goal of this section is to derive the privately and the socially optimal levels of 
geographic NGA coverage. In other words, this section aims at assessing the least 
densely populated geographic area that will be upgraded to any NGA technology when 
the investor is the unregulated monopolist and when the NGA investment is undertaken 
by the society. Substitution Eq. (7) into Eq. (6) gives the regional profits of the investor: 
2 5
52(2 1)
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i
i
A x
x
 

 (10) 
It is obvious that the investor’s profits in each geographic area are positive. This implies 
that the unregulated investor is willing to deploy a nationwide quality-differentiated NGA 
deployment, although the installation of fibre optics in the local loop will be far away 
from the consumers’ premises at the less densely populated areas. This fact gives rise to 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 2. When the unregulated investor is allowed to deploy a geographically 
differentiated NGA network, it is willing to invest in all geographic areas within a given 
country, although the fibre deployment in the less densely populated areas is rather 
insignificant. 
This result is a very interesting finding since is in contrast with existing studies which 
conclude that there is an optimal (one-dimensional) investment level that maximizes the 
investor’s profits. Of course, the result of proposition 2 is due to the ability of the investor 
to maximize its regional profits by providing a different NGA quality network in each 
geographic area. 
However, it is practical to limit our study to the lowest quality NGA network that is 
technically available. This is the Fibre-to-the-Curb (FTTC) architecture that provides 
internet connection speeds from 30Mbps to 100Mbps. Obviously, this is the reason that 
the Digital Agenda for Europe envisions that, by 2020, all Europeans will have access to 
internet speeds of at least 30Mbps.  
Therefore, it is assumed that the highest quality NGA network is achieved by the P2P 
architecture (which can provide internet connection speeds of up to 1000Mbps) and is 
denoted by maxiy . It is reasonable to consider 
max
iy  corresponds to the socially optimal 
level of NGA technology provided in the most densely populated area. This level is 
derived by setting  1 1ix x   in Eq. (9). Therefore: 
 max
1 2
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y y
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It is obvious that maxiy  takes its maximum value when the denominator of Eq. (11) is 
minimized. The positive root of 24 2 1   is 0.81 , which implies that 0.9   is a 
sufficient condition to ensure that 1 0
SWy  . Moreover, given that   negatively affects 
the optimal level of investment in quality, the highest internet connection speed is 
achieved for 0.9  , and hence, max* maxi iy y  for 0.9  , which implies that 
max* 6,36 1000Mbpsiy A  . Note that in the most densely populated area the privately 
optimal level of NGA technology is given by setting 1 1ix x   in Eq. (7) and is 
maximized for 0.9  . Hence:  
 1
2 1
M Ay 

 (12) 
As a result, the minimum threshold of the internet connection speed that is acceptable in 
the present study (i.e. 30Mbps) will be provided to the least densely populated area in 
which an NGA network will be deployed. Let denote this geographic are by [1, ]n n . 
Therefore: 
 
min * min min30 19.08 0.1908
1000 100
max
i i i in
y y y y A y A       
(13) 
Equating  Eqs. (13) and (7) and solving with respect to ix  gives the geographic area in 
which the monopolist investor will deploy the minimum quality NGA network. In 
addition, equating  Eqs. (13) and (9) and solving with respect to ix  yields the socially 
optimal geographic area covered by the minimum quality NGA network. The former 
geographic area reflects the privately optimal geographic NGA coverage 
max
Mx n , 
whereas the latter reflects the socially optimal geographic NGA coverage 
max
SWx . Since 
both levels of geographic coverage are affected by the slope of the inverse demand 
function, table 1 provides the impact of   on max
Mx  and max
SWx  for different values of 
[0.9,1.9] .  
Table 1 (for 10A   and min 1,908iy   ) 
  
 
0.9 1.4686 1.6903 
1.0 1.4206 1.6155 
1.1 1.3786 1.5519 
1.2 1.3415 1.4971 
1.3 1.3083 1.4491 
1.4 1.2784 1.4067 
1.5 1.2512 1.3689 
1.6 1.2264 1.3349 
1.7 1.2264 1.3349 
1.8 1.2264 1.3349 
1.9 1.2264 1.3349 
 
Table 1 reveals that the unregulated monopolist underinvests compared to the socially 
optimal geographic NGA coverage (i.e. max max
M SWx x ). This is an expected result since the 
socially optimal level of NGA technology in each geographic area is always higher than 
the corresponding privately optimal level, and hence, the same level of NGA technology 
(which, in this case, corresponds to 30Mbps) is privately provided to a more densely 
populated area than the corresponding socially optimal geographic area.  
Table 1 also provides useful implications about the feasibility of the first goal of the 
Digital Agenda for Europe concerning the provision of access to much higher internet 
speeds of above 30 Mbps to all Europeans. Assuming that the EC sets its objectives from 
a social rather than an industrial perspective, the total number of European households 
will correspond to a particular value of max
SWx , which in turn, corresponds to a particular 
value of   denoted by ˆ . Therefore, if the demand for ultra-fast broadband services is 
more inelastic than ˆ  (i.e. ˆ  ), then the achievement of the first goal of the Digital 
Agenda for Europe is not feasible. On the contrary, when ˆ  , the fulfillment of this 
goal is feasible when the privately optimal NGA coverage is at least equal to the socially 
optimal NGA coverage derived by ˆ . This means that the slope of the inverse demand 
function for NGA-based services should be significantly flatter than the respective slope 
that leads to the provision of 30 Mbps to all European households by the socially optimal 

max
Mx
max
SWx
investment in geographic coverage. The reason in that as the demand for NGA-based 
services becomes more elastic, the effectiveness of price discrimination to decrease 
consumer surplus in favor of the monopolist is limited, and hence, the monopolist has 
incentives to extend its NGA coverage to more geographic areas. 
This paper can also assess the feasibility of the second objective of the Digital Agenda 
for Europe, which refers to the goal of achieving the provision of internet connection 
speeds of 100 Mbps to 50% or more of European households.  Given that  1 6.36
SWy A  
represents the internet connection speed of 1000Mbps, the respective speed of 100Mbps 
is given by  
' '
max
1
0.636
10
i i iy y y A    (14) 
According to Eq. (7), the unregulated monopolist is willing to provide this internet 
connection speed to a particular geographic area. This area is derived by equating Eqs. 
(7) and (14) and solving with respect to ix . Since the derived level of ix  is a function of 
 , table 2 provides the geographic area in which the installed NGA network will provide 
internet speeds of 100Mbps ( 'max
Mx ), as well as, the respective socially optimal geographic 
NGA coverage. 
Table 2 (for 10A  ) 
  '
max
Mx  max
SWx  
0.9 1.1004 1.6903 
1 1.0695 1.6155 
1.1 1.0425 1.5519 
1.2 1.0186 1.4971 
1.3 0.9972 1.4491 
1.4 0.9779 1.4067 
1.5 0.9603 1.3689 
1.6 0.9442 1.3349 
1.7 0.9294 1.3349 
1.8 0.9158 1.3349 
1.9 0.9031 1.3349 
 
In order to assess whether the derived values of 'max
Mx  represent the 50% of the European 
households, we should first define the total number of the European households. Once 
again, we use as a point of reference the critical value ˆ   which corresponds to the 
provision of 30 Mbps to all European households under the socially optimal investment 
in coverage as presented by the second column of the above table. It is obvious that 
regardless of the particular value of ˆ 0.9  , even the highest level of 'max
Mx , which is 
achieved for 0.9  ) implies the provision of internet connection speeds of 100 Mbps to 
much less than 50% of European households. The reason is that the ratio of ( '
max 1
Mx  ) to 
any value of 
max( 1)
SWx   is lower than 50%.
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 Therefore, the second objective of the Digital 
Agenda for Europe is not a feasible goal.   
 
4. Conclusions 
The goal of this paper was to study the incentives of an unregulated monopolist to 
undertake the socially optimal investment in NGA networks when it takes into account 
the fact that the NGA deployment is a two-dimensional investment decision. In 
particular, the investor has to decide the quality of the NGA network and the geographic 
coverage of the NGA network. For this reason, a suitable modeling setup was used in 
order to reflect the fact that as an investment in quality upgrade extended to less densely 
populated (i.e. more rural) areas, not only it has a declining positive impact on the 
consumers’ willingness to pay, but also becomes marginally more expensive. This paper 
highlighted the expected result that the investor is better off by deploying a 
geographically differentiated NGA network (i.e. by installing a different quality NGA 
network in each geographic area).  
The main result of this paper was that although a geographically differentiated NGA 
investment provides the unregulated monopolist with incentives to install a nationwide 
NGA deployment, the monopolist underinvests compared to the socially optimal levels of 
both quality and geographic coverage. However, the fibre deployment in the less densely 
populated areas was found to be rather insignificant, and hence, certain assumptions were 
made in order to make the derived results comparable to the Europe 2020 Strategy which 
envisions that, by 2020: (i) all Europeans will have access to much higher internet speeds 
of above 30 Mbps; and (ii) 50% or more of European households will subscribe to 
internet connections above 100 Mbps. It was shown that the former objective is feasible 
when the demand for NGA-based services is significantly elastic, whereas the latter is not 
a feasible goal. 
Our framework is suitable to be extended in many different directions. Firstly, the focus 
of regulators is continuously shifting from the regulation of the retail market to the 
regulation of the wholesale market, and hence, the introduction of competition between 
an investor and an access seeker will certainly highlight the role of access regulation in 
encouraging NGA investments and promoting competition. Secondly, it is reasonable to 
expect that a geographically differentiated NGA deployment calls for geographically 
differentiated access remedies. Therefore, the modeling approach of Bourreau, Cambini 
and Hoernig (2013) which studies the impact of differentiated wholesale access schemes 
on coverage and welfare should be combined with the modeling setup of this paper in 
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 This result holds under the assumption that the household density in each geographic area follows the 
same distribution as the population density. 
order to conclude about the optimal pricing scheme that leads to the socially optimal 
geographically differentiated NGA deployment. A last interesting extension concerns the 
introduction of some dynamics in our setting since the most significant factors that affect 
the NGA deployment change over time. In this case, particular focus should be given on 
the impact of regulatory uncertainty on investment incentives. The reason is that 
variations in the demand and cost conditions may require regulatory remedies that change 
over time which, in turn, increase the risk of an ex ante NGA deployment.  
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